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The controversy surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline 
(DAPL) has put the peaceful plains of North Dakota in the 
national and international spotlight, drawing thousands of 
people to the confluence of the Missouri and Cannonball Rivers 
outside of Standing Rock Sioux Reservation for prayer and 
peaceful protest in defense of the Sioux Tribes’ treaties, lands, 
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cultural property, and waters. Spanning over seven months, 
including the harsh North Dakota winter, indigenous leaders 
and communities from around the world gathered in arguably 
the largest gathering of indigenous peoples in the United 
States in more than 100 years. 
Implicated in this fight are the 1851 and 1868 Treaties 
entered into by the United States and the Great Sioux Nation. 
The pipeline route, which was chosen without input from the 
Tribes, runs directly through the heart of treaty lands secured 
to the Great Sioux Nation in the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 
lands to which the Sioux Tribes continue to have strong 
cultural, spiritual, and historical ties.1 Furthermore, the 
construction and operation of an oil pipeline directly upstream 
from the Tribes’ current reservations not only threatens their 
hunting and fishing rights expressly reserved in the 1868 
Treaty (which have been affirmed in numerous subsequent acts 
of Congress), but also their reserved water rights pursuant to 
the Winters Doctrine.2 
The Tribe and their attorneys battled for injunctive relief 
to halt the pipeline in federal court, but the Treaties were 
largely absent in the pleadings and court opinions. However, 
the district court’s June 14, 2017, ruling squarely put the 
Treaties as the crux of the surviving argument.3 This presents 
problems for the court in both their applicability in the face of 
Congress’s plenary power over Indian tribes and diminished 
trust responsibility as well as the appropriate remedy for the 
Tribes when and if these treaty rights are violated.  
Accordingly, the case provides an opportunity to analyze the 
truth and lies surrounding the constitutional place of Indian 
treaties in federal courts. 
Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution states, “all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
 
 1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2017 WL 2573994 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 
16-1534) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 2. See Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, Sept. 17, 1851, ch. 250, 11 Stat. 749; see 
infra text accompanying note 167 (discussing the Sioux Treaties and subsequent 
legislation); see infra note 169 for a more detailed explanation of the Winters 
Doctrine. 
 3.  Memorandum Opinion at 41–42, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d. 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (1:16-cv-01534-JEB), ECF No. 
239 [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion]. 
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Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”4  Known as the “Supremacy Clause,” this 
constitutional provision has serious implications in federal 
Indian law. Of particular importance is whether treaties made 
with Indian tribes can be considered the “supreme Law of the 
Land.”5 The current litigation and historic indigenous uprising 
against DAPL, the route of which lies within recognized tribal 
treaty boundaries, provides a contemporary example of the 
limitations of the Supremacy Clause.6 This Article places the 
Standing Rock and other Sioux Tribes’ legal battle to halt 
DAPL against the historical background of Indian treaties and 
treaty rights. It offers a contemporary example of how federal 
courts’ application of Indian treaty rights and the limits of the 
Supremacy Clause fail to ensure Indian treaties and treaty 
rights are respected as the “supreme law of the land.” 
This Article is comprised of seven parts. In Part I, we 
provide a brief overview of the foundational relationship 
between Indian tribes and the United States as set forth in the 
Constitution. Specifically, we describe bilateral, consent-based 
treaty-making as the constitutionally mandated process 
governing relations with Indian tribes. Part II discusses how 
the end of treaty-making and the adoption of the plenary power 
doctrine resulted in a policy transition toward unilateral treaty 
abrogation and the diminishment of tribal treaty rights. In 
Part III, we further explore how tribal claims for treaty 
abrogation and land cession have been dealt with by federal 
courts, highlighting the inadequacy and unsatisfactory 
resolution of these claims. In Part IV, we analyze the Sioux 
Treaties in their historical context, in subsequent acts of 
Congress that implicated the treaties and the rights they 
preserve, and in major claims cases brought against the United 
States for land cession and abrogation of the Sioux Treaties. 
Parts V and VI look at how the federal courts have addressed 
Sioux land claims in the past. Finally, in Part VII, we set the 
background of the treaty rights against the Sioux Tribes’ legal 
efforts to halt construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline. 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Complaint, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
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I. INDIANS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
The United States ratified its first Indian Treaty with the 
Delaware Nation in 1778.7 The Delaware Treaty sought to 
allow for the passage of the United States Army through the 
territory of the Delaware Nation.8 In doing so, the language of 
the treaty explicitly recognized Indian ownership of the land 
and the authority of the Delaware to govern their territory.9 An 
integral component of this treaty was “a paradigm for tribal 
federal relations that can only be described as one of 
international self-determination.”10 Indeed, this first treaty—
along with subsequent treaties, the Constitution, and early 
congressional dealings with Indians—evidences a relationship 
between tribes and the federal government based on the United 
States’ recognition of tribes’ status as politically distinct 
sovereign nations existing alongside the United States.11 
For example, Article IX in the Articles of Confederation 
explicitly addressed the United States’ relationship with Indian 
tribes by granting Congress “the sole and exclusive right and 
power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with 
the Indian tribes, not members of any of the States, provided 
that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be 
not infringed or violated.”12 Trade agreements entered into 
under the Articles of Confederation establish that the power 
delegated in Article IX “constituted an authority to regulate the 
non-Indians who traded with the tribes, not an authority to 
regulate the tribes themselves.”13 
However, the Framers of the Constitution saw the Articles 
of Confederation’s grant of authority in Indian affairs as 
deficient.14 Importantly, the nascent constitutional objection to 
the Articles’ treatment of Indians was not the lack of power 
 
 7. Treaty with the Delawares, Delaware Nation–U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 
13. 
 8. Id.; Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 118–19 (2002). 
 9. Clinton, supra note 8, at 119. 
 10. Id. at 120. 
 11. Id. 
 12. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 (emphasis added). 
 13. Clinton, supra note 8, at 128. 
 14. Id.; see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 
n.4 (1985) (“Madison cited the National Government’s inability to control trade 
with the Indians as one of the key deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and 
urged adoption of the Indian Commerce Clause.”). 
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imposed over tribes, but the ability of states to interfere in the 
foreign affairs of another sovereign.15 To the Framers, Indian 
tribes were foreign nations with sovereignty over their lands 
and their governance, and any powers the states retained in 
dealing with Indian tribes would undermine what the Framers 
saw as the federal government’s exclusive right to manage 
political affairs with sovereign governments.16 
The text of the ratified Constitution made clear that there 
would be little change in the status of Indian tribes as political 
entities existing outside of the United States government.17 
The Constitution recognized tribes as sovereign nations in two 
ways. First, as tribes were not present at the Constitutional 
Convention and did not ratify the Constitution, and thus owed 
no political allegiance to the United States beyond their 
existing treaty obligations, Indians were excluded from the 
census and political participation by the “Indians not taxed” 
clause.18 Second, Indian tribes are expressly included in the 
Commerce Clause alongside two other sovereigns—foreign 
nations and the states.19 
The Indian Commerce Clause employs exactly the same 
word choice used in the Foreign Commerce Clause: 
“Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”20
 
By granting the 
federal government the exclusive right to regulate dealings 
“with” Indians, and not “of” Indians, the Indian Commerce 
Clause granted the federal government broad Indian affairs 
powers but did not purport to affect the powers or sovereignty 
of the Indian tribes.21 This fundamental aspect of the Indian 
Commerce Clause, reflected by the widespread use of treaties, 
 
 15. Clinton, supra note 8, at 128, 149. 
 16. Id.; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 509, 548–49 (2007); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in 
American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 49 (2005). 
 17. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 49 
(2012). 
 18. Id. at 50–51. 
 19. Clinton, supra note 8, at 130. 
 20. Id. at 131. By employing the same language, the Indian commerce power 
was meant to have the same meaning and scope as the foreign commerce power—
that is, the regulation of the United States’ political and economic dealings with a 
separate sovereign. Id. Accordingly, while tribes were not characterized as states 
or foreign nations under the Constitution, they were certainly regarded as 
governments whose economic and political dealings with the United States were 
significant enough to warrant inclusion in the Constitution alongside two other 
sovereigns. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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shows that although the federal government was undoubtedly 
concerned about regulating Indians, it simultaneously realized 
that the constitutionally proper method for creating such 
regulations was through bilateral treaties rather than 
unilateral congressional action. Thus, Congress viewed itself as 
having no constitutional basis to exercise authority over Indian 
tribes without consent through treaty, as evidenced by the 
United States maintaining and expanding treaty relationships 
with tribes.22 
The behavior of Congress for almost a century after 
adoption of the United States Constitution further reflects an 
understanding of the limited power granted in the Indian 
Commerce Clause and the constitutional necessity of treaty-
making with Indians.23 During this period, Congress passed no 
law directly regulating an Indian nation or its members in any 
fashion.24 While the Trade and Intercourse Acts clearly invoked 
the Indian Commerce Clause, the statutory restraints 
contained in the legislation focused on the regulation of non-
Indians conducting business with Indians and did not regulate 
tribes or their members. Even the Removal Act of 1830, which 
promoted the removal of tribes to west of the Mississippi, 
expressly required tribal consent through treaty for any 
removal.25 
As congressional actions following ratification of the 
Constitution conformed to understanding tribal-federal 
relations based on bilateral treaty-making, so too did the 
decisions of the early United States Supreme Court. In 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice John Marshall discussed at 
length the nature of aboriginal title and described the so-called 
Doctrine of Discovery, which provided an Indian “aboriginal 
right of occupancy” and exclusive preemptive rights of first 




 22. See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 58–59. 
 23. Clinton, supra note 8, at 135. 
 24. See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 
Stat. 329; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 
Stat. 139; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729. 
 25. See Clinton, supra note 8, at 136 n.60 (explaining that the Removal Act of 
1830 only applied to “such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange 
the lands where they now reside, and remove there”); see generally Minnesota v. 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188 (1999) (invalidating a 
removal order for lack of tribal consent). 
 26. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
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decision held that conveyances of Indian land to non-Indians 
could not be valid without the assent of the government 
holding preemptive rights to the land. The Court also noted the 
Tribe’s independent power to make and enforce their own laws, 
precluding federal law from otherwise binding the Tribe.27 
Thus, according to M’Intosh, federal supremacy applied to 
citizens entering into agreements with tribes, but did not apply 
to Indian tribes as separate “domestic” nations. 
The “Cherokee Removal” cases provided the Supreme 
Court another opportunity to analyze the constitutionally 
defined limits to the federal government’s powers as they 
related to dealing with Indian tribes.28 The Court ultimately 
ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, as the 
Constitution only authorized the Court to hear cases brought 
by foreign nations. In the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall 
undertook to explain the treaty relationship between the 
Cherokee and the United States in acknowledging that the 
treaties put the tribe under the protection of the United States, 
signifying “that the Cherokees were then dependents.”29 
But as Robert N. Clinton observed, 
In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall employed the 
term dependent, not as a statement of political inferiority or 
a statement of federal supremacy, but, rather, as an implied 
criticism of the political branches of the United States 
government which had failed to enforce the treaty 
 
 27. Id. at 593. The Court explained that: 
Admitting [tribal] power to change their laws or usages, so far as to 
allow an individual to separate a portion of their lands from the common 
stock, and hold it in severalty, still it is a part of their territory, and is 
held under them, by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its 
efficacy from their will; and, if they choose, to resume it, and make a 
different disposition of the land, the courts of the United States cannot 
interpose for the protection of the title. The person who purchases lands 
from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, 
so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under their 
protection, and subject to their laws. If they annul the grant, we know of 
no tribunal which can revise and set aside [their decision]. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 28. Clinton, supra note 8, at 138. In 1828 Georgia passed a series of laws 
diminishing the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation by claiming jurisdiction over 
Indian lands. Id. After failed attempts to gain redress from the federal 
government, the Tribe filed an injunction to prevent Georgia from executing the 
laws. Id. 
 29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 40 (1831). 
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obligations of protection to the Cherokee Nation. Thus, 
dependence for Chief Justice Marshall was not a source of 
federal authority over the Cherokee Nation. Rather, it 
constituted the description of a relationship created by 
treaty in which the federal government owed the Cherokee 
certain obligations of protection: it was a source of rights as 
promised in the treaties.30 
In Worcester v. Georgia, the Court reached the merits of 
the laws at issue in Cherokee Nation when two non-Indians 
appealed convictions under a Georgia statute that prohibited 
their presence on Indian lands without a license.31 The Court 
ultimately found the Georgia statute invalid, largely based on 
the reasoning that it violated the sovereignty of the Cherokee 
Nation as secured in their Treaty.32 In noting that “the settled 
doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not 
surrender its independence—its right to self-government, by 
associating with a stronger, and taking its protection,” Chief 
Justice Marshall laid the foundation for an understanding of 
Indian tribes’ “dependence” without diminishment of their 
sovereignty.33 According to Justice Marshall, Congress could 
act in relation to Cherokee lands only if confirmed by the 
consent of the Cherokee Nation through a treaty.34 Thus, not 
only did the state of Georgia have no power to legislate over the 
Indians, neither did Congress, as the exclusive federal power 
over Indian affairs was limited to regulating the activities of 
nonmembers in their dealings with Indian tribes. 
During the 1880s, the Supreme Court would continue to 
support the view of Indian tribes as sovereigns located within 
the boundaries of the United States but not subject to its 
governance.35 
In Ex parte Crow Dog, an Indian was tried and convicted 
in the Territory of Dakota for the murder of another  
Indian.36 In his appeal, Crow Dog argued that the federal court 
lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence because the crime 
 
 30. Clinton, supra note 8, at 141. 
 31. 31 U.S. 515, 537, 561–62 (1832). 
 32. Clinton, supra note 8, at 141. 
 33. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560–61. 
 34. Id. at 561. 
 35. Clinton, supra note 8, at 143. 
 36. 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883). 
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was committed on tribal land, and both the attacker and the 
victim were Native American. The Supreme Court referred to 
the codified version of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, and 
held that it expressly prohibited federal jurisdiction. The Court 
granted Crow Dog’s writ of habeas corpus and ordered his 
release, declaring that “to uphold the jurisdiction exercised in 
this case, would be to reverse in this instance the general policy 
of the government towards the Indians.”37 
A number of Congressional actions in the late nineteenth 
century laid the foundation for the fundamental change to 
consent-based treaty-making Indian policy.38 In 1871, Congress 
decided to end treaty-making with Indians.39 Previously, 
Indian Commissioners and the Executive Branch had primarily 
undertaken treaty-making with advice and consent from the 
Senate as prescribed by the treaty provision of the 
Constitution.40 Many in the House of Representatives, who 
were left in the shadows of treaty-making except for their 
routine appropriations, wanted a seat at the Indian policy 
table. The House ultimately achieved its demands in an 
appropriations rider which gave the House power to change 
and approve “agreements” with tribes.41 
By the end of treaty-making, more than 200 Indian 
treaties had been negotiated by the executive branch and 
ratified by the Senate.42 Despite Congress’s decision to stop 
treating with Indian tribes, treaties between the United States 
and tribes remain the cornerstone of the legal relationship 
between Indian tribes and the federal government.43 In fact, 
the passing of the 1871 statute itself merely evidences the 
negative view of tribal sovereignty, which until this point had 
necessitated consent-based treaty-making for the regulation of 
tribes and their members.44 
 
 37. Id. at 572. 
 38. Clinton, supra note 8, at 164. 
 39. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 71 (2012)). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 41. Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)). 
 42. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 59 (citing CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN 
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 8 (1987)). 
 43. Id. at 60 (citing Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and 
the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 974–79 (1996)). 
 44. Clinton, supra note 8, at 168. The constitutionality of this Act, which 
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“There can be no greater expression of sovereign respect 
between the United States and another political entity than 
that of a treaty relationship under the Constitution.”45  Thus, 
the main constitutional provision that governed the United 
States’ relationship with Indian tribes was not the Indian 
Commerce Clause, which was used to pass legislation 
regulating non-Indian conduct in relation to tribes, but rather 
the Supremacy Clause, which gave effect to Indian treaties by 
barring state or private interference with the Indian peoples’ 
land and their sovereign control. 
As treaties became the primary instruments for carrying 
out federal Indian policy, they also became the main source of 
rights for tribes under the Constitution, deriving from their 
place as law under the Supremacy Clause.46 The treaties 
between the United States and the Indians constitute a critical 
recognition and guarantee of tribal rights to land, resources, 
and sovereignty over their own affairs and governance.47 
II.  THE END OF TREATY-MAKING AND THE CREATION OF 
PLENARY POWER 
After the end of treaty-making in 1871, Congress moved to 
reinvent Indian policy by expressly asserting, for the first time, 
direct control over Indian tribes’ sovereign right to self-
government in the Major Crimes Act.48 Passed in 1885, this Act 
gave federal courts jurisdiction over Native Americans for 
seven enumerated crimes committed against non-Indians.49 
Placed within the broader history of Indian policy, this Act 
 
fundamentally poses a separation of powers issue as it takes powers reserved in 
the Constitution for the executive and places it squarely in the Congress, has 
never been challenged. Id. 
 45. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 59 (citing Mike Townsend, Congressional 
Abrogation of Indian Treaties: Reevaluation and Reform, 98 YALE L. J. 793, 797–
98 (1989)). 
 46. Clinton, supra note 8, at 141. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153); Clinton, supra note 8, at 170. 
 49. Major Crimes Act § 9 (“That immediately upon and after the date of the 
passage of this act, all Indians committing against the person or property of 
another Indian or other person any of the following crimes, namely, murder, 
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny, 
within any territory of the United States, and either within or without the Indian 
reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of said territory relating to said 
crimes.”). 
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followed the Indian assimilation ideals that garnered wide 
acceptance and support among the public and government in 
the 1880s.50 As the Act constituted the first effort to assert 
direct legislative power over tribal autonomy, the subsequent 
legal challenge in United States v. Kagama would provide the 
first case to test the power of Congress to depart from the 
treaty-based understandings of the limitations of federal 
authority under the Constitution.51 
Kagama involved murder and accomplice indictments 
against two Indians for the killing of another Indian occurring 
on an Indian reservation.52 The United States claimed 
jurisdiction under the new Major Crimes Act, and argued the 
constitutionality of the Act rested in part on the Indian 
Commerce Clause.53
 
However, Justice Miller, writing for a 
unanimous Court, summarily rejected the Indian Commerce 
Clause as a source of congressional authority to directly 
regulate Indians, holding that the clause did not allow for “a 
system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their 
reservations.”54 
Instead, without a constitutional basis to assert 
jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands, the Court took it 
upon itself to undertake an “extra-constitutional” endeavor to 
uphold the Act.55 Noting that Tribes were territorially within 
the bounds of the United States, the Court pointed to the 
status of Tribes as “wards of the nation . . . dependent on the 
United States” for the assertion that the federal government’s 
duty to protect the rights of Indians, as secured through 
bilateral treaties, additionally granted Congress the unfettered 
authority to regulate away the sovereignty of tribes.56 
The Court’s decision in Kagama relied on Justice 
 
 50. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 803–05 (2006). 
 51. Clinton, supra note 8, at 171. 
 52. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court framed the question of the case as 
“[w]hether the courts of the United States have jurisdiction or authority to try and 
punish an Indian belonging to an Indian tribe for committing the crime of murder 
upon another Indian belonging to the same Indian tribe . . . said crime having 
been committed upon an Indian reservation.” Id. at 375. 
 53. Id. at 378. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Clinton, supra note 8, at 181. 
 56. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84 (“These Indian tribes are the wards of the 
nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely 
for their daily food. Dependent for the political rights.”). 
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Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation as the justification for 
these powers. However, as one commentator has noted, the 
“Court’s reading of protection [as a source of power over Indian 
tribes] reversed the concept’s earlier meaning. Crafted to 
prevent Native alliances and forestall warfare, the principle of 
sole federal protection of Indians originally stemmed from 
Native power, not weakness.”57 By claiming the “dependency” 
of Indian tribes as a justification of the imposition of 
congressional power upon them, the Court upended the 
relationship arising from a treaty-based federal obligation to 
protect sovereignty in Cherokee Nation.58 For the Court in 
Kagama, “wardship” of Indian peoples did not link to federal 
treaty obligations securing the protection of tribal sovereignty, 
but rather became a vehicle to express the assumed racial and 
cultural inferiority of tribes.59 
Thus, instead of relying on a textual delegation of 
authority over Indian tribes, which the Court itself found did 
not exist, the Court relied simply on the duties and protections 
secured through the treaty-making process. One scholar has 
described this as “a tour de force in judicial constitutional 
creativity” and a “major departure from the established norms 
of constitutional interpretation.”60 While not expressly 
providing for the broad plenary power espoused by today’s 
Court, the judicial gymnastics that allowed for the 
abandonment of stare decisis in Kagama opened the door for 
the rise of unilateral congressional divestiture of Indian tribes’ 
treaty-secured rights and lands.61 In fact, almost all federal 
policy decisions relating to Indians could now be justified by 
using the Court’s newly constructed plenary power doctrine, 
which disposed of the historical consent-based relationship in 
favor of direct and unfettered governance of Indians outside of 
treaty-making.62 
Congress further dispensed with the traditional 
understanding of tribal sovereignty and separatism under the 
 
 57. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond The Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 
1012, 1081 (2015). 
 58. Clinton, supra note 8, at 175. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 172. 
 61. Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: 
Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
507, 529 (1987). 
 62. Clinton, supra note 8, at 182. 
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Constitution in the General Allotment Act of 1887.63 The 
general purpose of the Act was to push for the assimilation of 
tribes through the reduction of the reservation land base by 
allotting land in severalty to individual Indians.64 The allotted 
lands were held in trust by the federal government for a period 
of twenty-five years, during which the Indians were to embrace 
agriculture, Christianity, and all the other ideals 
accompanying citizenship in the United States.65  At the end of 
this period individual Indians would receive the land in a fully 
alienable patent in fee, often subject to the civil and criminal 
laws of the state.66 However, the trust period was “short-lived,” 
ending in 1906 when Congress authorized the early issuance of 
patents to individual Indians if they had been determined 
“competent” by Indian Agents, who were generally government 
officials authorized to interact with Indians on behalf of the 
federal government.67 
The allotment policies described in the General Allotment 
Act and its amendments had a devastating effect on the 
communal reservation land base of Indian tribes. As Judith 
Royster has explained: 
Thousands of Indian owners disposed of their lands by 
voluntary or fraudulent sales; many others lost their lands 
at sheriffs’ sales for nonpayment of taxes or other liens. By 
the end of the allotment era, two-thirds of all the land 
allotted—approximately 27 million acres—had passed into 
non-Indian ownership.68 
While the practical effects of the General Allotment Act were 
devastating to tribal lands and cultures, the legal challenge 
mounted against the Act would prove equally as damaging. 
Just as the Court used the challenge of the Major Crimes Act to 
reformulate the basic treaty-based understanding of tribal 
federal relations, the first major challenge to the General 
 
 63. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as 
amended at 24 U.S.C. §§ 331–358, 381 (1994)). 
 64. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10 
(1995). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 10–11; see also, Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (amending 
§ 6 of the General Allotment Act) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2015)). 
 68. Royster, supra note 64, at 12. 
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Allotment Act in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock would provide the 
Court with the chance to cement the plenary power doctrine in 
its jurisprudence.69 Lone Wolf presented the Court with the 
opportunity to critically rethink the constitutional relationship 
between Indian tribes and the federal government prescribed 
in Kagama.70 Instead, the Court focused on the narrow 
question of whether Congress could unilaterally abrogate a 
treaty between the federal government and an Indian tribe, 
rather than the broader underlying question of what 
precipitated the changing legal relationship of the two 
sovereigns.71 
In Lone Wolf, the Court held that Congress had both the 
power to assert criminal jurisdiction over Indians on their own 
lands and the broad power to unilaterally abrogate Indian 
treaties.72  At issue in the case was Article 12 of the Treaty of 
Medicine Lodge Creek between the Kiowas and Comanches 
and the United States, which set aside a reservation and 
expressly provided that any further land cessions from the 
Tribes would not be valid without the approval of at least 
three-fourths of all adult males occupying the 
reservation.73 However, in 1900, Congress passed an 
“agreement,” which provided for further cessions that opened 
up a large part of the reservation for occupancy of non-Indian 
homesteaders.74 
The Tribes argued that the “agreement” was obtained by 
fraud and lacked the three-fourths consent required by the 
treaty.75  As such, the legislation opening up the reservation for 
settlement under the Allotment Act amounted to a unilateral 
abrogation of their treaty-guaranteed property rights, which 
they argued violated their due process.76 Although it was clear 
that Congress had blatantly and unilaterally breached the 
 
 69. Frank Pommersheim, Lone Wolf v. Hitchock: A Little Haiku Essay on a 
Missed Constitutional Moment, 38 TULSA L. REV. 49, 52 (2002). 
 70. Id. at 52. 
 71. Id. at 50. 
 72. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,  565 (1903). 
 73. Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche arts. 2, 12, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat. 
581. This type of provision was common in many of the removal treaties signed 
with tribes and caused problems for the federal government in the efforts to 
secure land necessary to support the rapid western settlement. See Clinton, supra 
note 8, at 182–83 n.203. 
 74. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, 31 Stat. 676. 
 75. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567. 
 76. Id. at 567–68. 
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treaty, the Court rejected the due process argument and 
thereby avoided the question of the validity of the 
“agreement.”77 Instead, the Court relied on the extra-
constitutional “ward” theory employed in Kagama to validate 
the congressional divestment of treaty-reserved lands.78 The 
Court stated that “Congress [possesses] a paramount power 
over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of 
guardianship over their interests, and . . . such authority might 
be implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty 
with the Indians.”79 The Court went on to claim that Congress’s 
plenary authority over the Indians was a political one, which 
had been wielded by Congress “from the beginning.”80 
In a relatively short passage, the Court made a number of 
assertions that would prove to haunt the constitutionally 
rooted understanding of tribal-federal relations based on 
consensual treaty-making. Not only did the Court fail to cite a 
textual delegation of this authority from the Constitution, it 
erroneously claimed that this unilateral plenary power over 
Tribal affairs had been exercised by Congress throughout 
history.81 This simply was not true given that the Major 
Crimes Act was the first instance of Congress regulating the 
affairs of Indian tribes. Moreover, the Court went beyond the 
necessary justification in claiming that Congress’s plenary 
power over Native American affairs precluded the courts from 
exercising judicial review over congressional acts asserting 
control over tribes.82 
Ultimately, the Lone Wolf decision marked the end of 
consent-based, treaty-oriented Indian policy by replacing the 
government-to-government relationship set forth in the 
Constitution, previously accepted by the Supreme Court and 
practiced by Congress, with the judicially created plenary 
 
 77. Id. at 557 (indicating that Congress knew it had not obtained the requisite 
signatures of three-fourths of the adult males on the reservation). 
 78. Id. at 565. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 568. 
 82. Id. 
[A]s Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot 
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of 
this legislation. If injury was occasioned . . . by the use made by Congress 
of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress, 
and not to the courts. 
Id. 
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power doctrine.83 Under this doctrine, Congress was now 
unbeholden to the multitude of treaties signed with Indian 
nations, and free to diminish Indian lands without consent.84 
The modern Supreme Court continues to utilize the 
plenary power doctrine to justify the regulation and continued 
diminishment of tribal sovereignty.85 However, over time, it 
has fundamentally changed the justification for such authority 
over Indian tribes in an effort to sanitize the doctrine from the 
racialized roots embedded in the wardship theory.86 The Court 
officially dispensed with its reliance on the colonial “ward” 
theory in favor of a source of textual delegation in the 
Constitution in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission.87 In footnote seven, the Court found a textual 
delegation in the Constitution, stating that “the source of 
federal authority over Indian matters . . . derives from federal 
responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and 
for treaty-making.”88 This statement is perplexing, especially 
considering that the Court in Kagama expressly rejected the 
Indian Commerce Clause as a justification for plenary power.89 
The shift away from the colonial-ward paradigm perhaps 
also signals the Court’s understanding of a need to base such 
authority on a textual delegation.90 As commentators have 
noted, in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, the Court 
doubled down on its footnote in McClanahan when it held that 
“the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to 
provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of 
 
 83. Pommersheim, supra note 69; Clinton, supra note 8, at 185 (“[I]t was the 
Lone Wolf decision itself that marked the real beginning of consistent unilateral 
congressional action in governing Indian tribes.”). 
 84. Clinton, supra note 8, at 185. 
 85. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE 
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN 
AMERICA (2005). 
 86. Clinton, supra note 8, at 195; see also Ablavsky, supra note 57, at 1082. 
 87. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
 88. Id. at 172 n.7. 
 89. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886). 
While we are not able to see, in either of these clauses of the 
Constitution and its amendments, any delegation of power to enact a 
code of criminal law for the punishment of the worst class of crimes 
known to civilized life when committed by Indians, there is a suggestion 
in the manner in which the Indian tribes are introduced into that clause 
which may have a bearing on the subject before us. 
Id. 
 90. Clinton, supra note 8, at 196. 
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Indian affairs.”91 Additionally, as recently as 2004, the Court 
pointed to the Indian Commerce Clause as one source of 
Congress’s plenary power.92 Nevertheless, while the modern 
Court explicitly cites textual justifications for the plenary 
power doctrine, its roots in the colonial and racist beliefs 
exemplified in the “ward theory” continue to limit tribal 
assertion of rights and lands secured through bilateral treaties 
with the United States government.93 
The negotiation of bilateral treaties with the United States 
had, since the time of discovery, been the primary means by 
which Indians had protected their sovereignty and their lands.  
The Court’s holdings in Kagama and Lone Wolf turned this 
historical method of dealing on its head by recognizing, absent 
a textual delegation, broad congressional plenary power over 
Indian affairs.94 Thus, Indian tribes were forced to find a new 
way to preserve their treaty rights and resources from 
“judicially unfettered” congressional power.95 The tribes knew 
after Lone Wolf that the courts would not stop the unilateral 
abrogation of Indian treaties, but they could hold the 
government responsible to compensate them for land takings.96 
With the advent of the New Deal policies in the 1930s 
came a shift in Indian policy as well. The Roosevelt 
administration dispensed with Allotment Era policies of the 
nineteenth century in its New Deal for Indian tribes.97  
Additionally, a judicial reconsideration of the government’s 
dealings with Indians, specifically in the context of land 
cessions, was about to unfold.98 
 
 91. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). 
 92. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
 93. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 85. 
 94. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 90. 
 95. See id.; Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the 
Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 
466 (1998). 
 96. Cross, supra note 95, at 468. 
 97. GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM: 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934–45, at 1–16 (U 
of Neb. Press, 1980); The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); see also G. William Rice, The Indian 
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L. REV. 575, 578–89 (2009). 
 98. Cross, supra note 95, at 466–67. 
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III. TRIBAL CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURTS 
This Part documents how the federal courts have dealt 
with Tribal claims for treaty abrogation and land cession. It 
begins by outlining the early caselaw developed regarding the 
compensability of tribal land and treaty claims. It then 
discusses the Indian Claims Commission Act while 
highlighting the provisions and loopholes which hampered the 
effective resolution of many Indian claims based on violation of 
their treaties. 
Despite the long and well-documented history of abuse and 
misdealing, Indian tribal claims against the federal 
government occupy a relatively marginalized position in 
domestic law.99 But as sovereign nations preexisting the 
Constitution with internationally binding treaties ratified by 
Congress, tribal governments who wish to bring claims for 
violation of treaty rights or land claims against the federal 
government are “relegated to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Federal Claims, and lumped in with the pleas of fired civil 
servants, disgruntled taxpayers, and defense contractors.”100 
As Nell Jessup Newton has summarized, “The claims stories, 
when broken from the dry legal recitation of the facts in the 
cases and placed in context, reveal powerfully the inadequacies 
of the dominant group’s stories.”101 
Historically, there were three statutory methods under 
which Indian tribes could seek money damages against the 
federal government: special jurisdictional acts,102 the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, and the Tucker Act.103 “In each case, 
 
 99. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. 
U. L. REV. 753, 755 (1992) (citing Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian 
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 686 (1989)). 
 100. Steven Paul McSloy, Revisiting the “Courts of the Conqueror”: American 
Indian Claims Against the United States, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 537, 541 (1994). The 
Court of Federal Claims was established by Congress in 1855 for the purpose of 
determining private claims against the United States federal government.  
Throughout its history, the Court of Federal Claims has gone through many 
changes in its form, procedures, and scope of jurisdiction, but maintains its place 
as the sole judicial remedy for private citizens seeking monetary redress from the 
federal government. Newton, supra note 99, at 755. 
 101. Newton, supra note 99, at 760. 
 102. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92 § 9, 
12 Stat. 765. 
 103. For a more detailed discussion on each of these methods of claims, see 
Newton, supra note 99, at 768. 
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the claims were usually tried in an Article I court, either the 
Indian Claims Commission or the trial court of the old Court of 
Claims.”104 
While the primary purpose for the creation of the Court of 
Claims in 1855 was to open the doors to citizen suits against 
the government, any hope that Indians had of using the Court 
of Claims to seek redress was summarily dashed in 1863 when 
Congress amended the 1855 Act to specifically exempt claims 
“growing out of or dependent on any treaty stipulation entered 
into . . .  with Indian tribes.”105 With this amendment, Indians 
had to petition Congress for special legislation waiving 
sovereign immunity and granting jurisdiction to the Court of 
Claims to sue for wrongdoing, including land cession and treaty 
violations. 
One such act was used to initiate the case United States v. 
Shoshone Tribe, which would prove to be one of the first times 
the Supreme Court would address Indian land claims and 
outline the judicial protections against the unilateral taking of 
Indian lands.106 The facts in Shoshone were straightforward 
and painted a picture ripe for compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment. The federal government had settled another tribe 
on the Shoshone Reservation without their consent, in conflict 
with the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, which provided the land 
was “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed occupation of 
the Shoshone.”107 Thus, the Shoshone sought to be 
 
 104. Id. at 769. 
 105. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765; see California v. United States, 
119 F. Supp. 174, 177–81 (Ct. Cl. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954). 
Further: 
Because section 9 of the 1863 Act denied jurisdiction of claims arising 
out of Indian treaties, Indians had to continue to petition Congress for 
special grants of jurisdiction to gain a forum for their claims against the 
government. Thus, before Indian tribes were granted general access to 
the Court of Claims for claims based on treaty title, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 
(1946), they were limited in their suits by the language of the 
congressional jurisdictional acts. These provisions merely removed the 
bar of sovereign immunity to suit; the tribes still had to base their claims 
on an independent substantive cause of action or legal theory . . . . 
Daniel G. Kelly, Jr., Indian Title: The Rights of American Natives in Lands They 
Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655, 664 n.84 (1975). 
 106. An Act Authorizing the Shoshone Tribe of Indians of the Wind River 
Reservation in Wyoming to submit claims to the Court of Claims, ch. 302, 44 Stat. 
1349 (1927); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938). 
 107. Shoshone, 304 U.S. at 113 (quoting Treaty with the Eastern Band 
Shoshoni and Bannock, 1868 art. 2, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673). 
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compensated for the taking, including the valuable timber and 
mineral resources that were exploited on the reservation.108 
The Court agreed, and held that the government’s taking 
of tribal interest in land made them liable for payment of just 
compensation due to the Tribe’s right of use and occupancy 
recognized in the Treaty.109 In doing so, the Court limited its 
holding in Lone Wolf, insofar as Congress had the power to 
pass laws regulating alienation of land through descent, but 
that this power, stemming from the federal government’s 
guardianship of the “ward” Indian tribes, did nothing to the 
Tribe’s ownership of the land.110 
After Shoshone, and throughout most of the 1940s and 
1950s, the Supreme Court continued to struggle to develop a 
clear framework of Indian land claims that could square the 
Supremacy Clause against Congress’s absolute plenary power 
and the Fifth Amendment permission of takings with just 
compensation.111 Instead of developing a modern Indian 
takings regime, they largely categorized claims into two 
groups: those that had a protected class of “recognized” Indian 
title based on federal recognition, often through treaty dealings 
or other agreements with the government; and those that held 
“unrecognized” Indian title-based claims for compensation 
through Indian title on aboriginal use and occupancy.112 
The Court would draw a bright-line distinction between 
these two categories of claims and take a step towards limiting 
compensation for Indian land claims generally in Tee-Hit-Ton 
v. United States.113 Tee-Hit-Ton concerned a takings claim by a 
small community of Indians for the sale of timber within the 
Tongass National Forest in Alaska.  The Indians claimed title 
based on the aboriginal use of the area, and sued for 
compensation of the value of the timber based on the 
demonstrated use and government recognition of their title to 
the land at issue. The Court, relying on the lack of official 
recognition of their use and occupancy of the land, and the 
Indians’ failure to move beyond a “hunting and fishing stage of 
civilization,” found no recognized title to the land as in 
 
 108. Id. at 112–13. 
 109. Id. at 117. 
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 111. Cross, supra note 95, at 469. 
 112. Id. at 470. 
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Shoshone, but rather only “claims to rights to use identified 
territories.”114 The Court went on to hold that Indian 
occupation of land alone, without specific governmental 
recognition of said ownership, did not create a right against 
taking or extinction by the United States that would be 
protected under the Fifth Amendment.115 
As one commentator opined, after Tee-Hit-Ton, 
Indians were entitled to just compensation for a taking of 
their lands only if they could meet two conditions.  First, 
they had to show that Congress had taken deliberate action 
to recognize their permanent use and occupancy rights. . . . 
[This was] usually embodied in an authoritative treaty, 
statute, or a demonstrated congressional course of  
conduct . . . . Second, they had to show that Congress had 
not acted in its Lone Wolf garb as Indian guardian when it 
took their lands.116 
Despite the Court’s discrete distinction limiting Indian land 
claims, the decision in Tee-Hit-Ton must be read against the 
creation of the Indian Claims Commission, which operated as 
Congress’s solution to the Indian land claim problem.117 
The plenary power of Congress to abrogate treaties 
notwithstanding, the Court’s indecision regarding the 
compensability and status of Indian land claims incited concern 
among the non-Indian occupants of former Indian lands.118 As 
worries mounted, so did the pressures on Congress to enact a 
title-clearing mechanism that would finally remove potential 
Indian title claims from their lands.119 There was also a 
contingent who supported the settling of Indian claims based 
on the historical wrongs perpetrated by the federal government 
and the contributions of Indians to World War II efforts.120 
Congress created the Indian Claims Commission by the 
Act of August 13, 1946 to hear claims of “any Indian tribe, 
band, or other identifiable group of American Indians against 
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the United States.”121  The Act provided for review of decisions 
to the Court of Claims, followed by certiorari review to the 
Supreme Court. The Act provided broad grounds for recovery, 
including claims based on “unconscionable consideration” for 
tribal lands which were taken and “claims based on fair and 
honorable dealing not recognized by any existing rule of law or 
equity.”122 But underneath this seemingly magnanimous intent 
was another motive. A major goal of the legislation was to 
remove clouds from land titles so as to facilitate the continued 
expansion and settlement of the American West.123 Thus, the 
Act served to permanently settle Indian tribes’ land claims in 
order to “prepare them for the termination of their special 
status under United States law.”124 
Perhaps this is why the Act, as interpreted by the Court, 
created a new cause of action for all Indian claims, not only 
those of sound legal nature, but also those “of a purely moral 
nature not cognizable in courts of the United Sates under any 
existing rules of law or equity.”125 Specifically, the Act created 
five broad classes of claims for Indian tribes: 
(1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution, 
laws, treaties of the United States, and Executive orders of 
the President; (2) all other claims in law or equity, including 
those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claimant 
would have been entitled to sue in a court of the United 
States if the United States was subject to suit; (3) claims 
which would result if the treaties, contracts, and 
agreements between the claimant and the United States 
were revised on the ground of fraud, duress  . . . ; (4) claims 
arising from the taking by the United States . . . of lands 
owned or occupied by the claimant without the payment for 
such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and 
(5) claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are 
 
 121. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (codified as 
amended at §§ 70–70w (1976)), repealed by Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-465, 
90 Stat. 1990. 
 122. Id. § 2. 
 123. Cross, supra note 95, at 473. 
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 125. Kelly, supra note 105, at 676 (quoting Otoe v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 
265, 275 (Ct. Cl. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955)). 
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not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity.126 
Specifically, class four has been used to recover against the 
United States for outright taking of aboriginal title lands since 
the language of that clause covers takings by treaty “or 
otherwise” of Indian owned or “occupied” lands.127 Conversely, 
when a treaty is at issue, tribes have based claims under clause 
three, including arguments that the “treaty was secured by 
fraud or duress or that the Government paid an unconscionably 
low consideration for the lands ceded.”128 Additionally, clause 
five’s considerably broad language addressing “fair and 
honorable dealings” has been used as the basis for claims 
whether or not a treaty is involved and it has augmented 
claims based on clause three or four recovery.129 
Despite the various causes of action under the Act, there 
were many barriers to successful and just resolution of what 
factually seemed to be straightforward property claims. The 
primary obstacle for Indian claims was posed by the formation 
of the body envisioned in the Act itself. The legislation allowed 
for the creation of two distinctly different models to hear and 
decide Indian claims—a cooperative model, which hinged on 
the creation of an investigative division charged with 
investigating facts and submitting findings to the Commission, 
and an adversarial model—which modeled the Court of Claims 
in many respects, including more formalized procedures and a 
focus on monetary reimbursement.130 In the end, the 
Commission, composed of commissioners who had no 
experience in Indian law, adopted an adversarial model and 
eventually transformed the Commission into a claims court.131 
In doing so, the court “viewed its remedial arsenal as restricted 
to money damages, a view that seems consistent with the 
legislative intent.”132 This adversarial court procedure also 
meant that tribes would face considerable evidentiary issues 
 
 126. Indian Claims Commission Act § 2. 
 127. Kelly, supra note 105, at 676 (citing United States v. Fort Sill Apache 
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proving control of the exact land at issue, government coercion, 
and unfair dealings in the treaty process.133 
Unfortunately for the tribes, proving how unconscionable 
the Government’s actions were in the dealings and land grabs 
was only the beginning of the problem.134 In addition to 
entering the courts to fight an arsenal of highly trained 
government attorneys, tribes also “had to walk through a 
minefield of liability-limiting rules.”135 Two of those rules 
engrained in the Indian Claims Commission Act (which would 
play a major role in the Sioux land claims brought before the 
federal courts) included the disallowance of interest on claims 
and the inclusion of gratuitous offsets.136 
One of the major concerns in settling Indian claims was 
the huge amount of interest potentially owed to tribes for land 
cession claims based on events decades before. In that regard, 
the government favorably viewed the limiting of recovery to 
the Indian Claims Commission Act and its disallowance of 
interest awards.137 Because Congress had not submitted itself 
to the liability of interest awards in the Act, the courts used a 
strict construction of limiting liability to find the Act did not 
allow it. Instead, bound by congressional intent that 
reparations be paid for Indian title takings, the courts 
undertook to determine just rewards for land cession while 
avoiding the huge accrued interest payments due if recovery 
was based on traditional Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.138 
This made the government liable for interest on an Indian 
claim only if and when there was a statute, contract, or 
constitutional claim because of the no-interest rule.139 
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In the end, the process of settling Indian claims would 
outlast the Indian Claims Commission, which would prove to 
be simply an element in the grand scheme.140 During its time, 
however, the “bureaucratically oriented” nature of the 
Commission bred deep discontent among Indians, climaxing 
with its rule of money payments in lieu of land restoration.141 
For some, the Commission did not fulfill its purpose of 
liquidating Indian rights or even Indian title, rather it 
“updated the legal parity” of the land purchases the United 
States had made.142 As Vine Deloria Jr. has argued, the 
Commission worked “merely to clear out the underbrush and 
allow the claims created by the forced political and economic 
dependency during the last century to emerge.”143 
IV. THE SIOUX TREATIES OF 1851 AND 1868—THEN AND NOW 
Beginning in 1804, when the Sioux made first contact with 
Lewis and Clark’s expedition, numerous treaties were entered 
into between the United States and bands of the Oceti 
Šakowin, the “Seven Council Fires” or the Great Sioux 
Nation.144 However, despite demarcations of Indian lands in 
these treaties, settlers and the burgeoning fur trade led to a 
continued push into Sioux territories and culture.145 This 
eventually prompted Congress to take action to secure safe 
traveling routes between the Missouri River frontier and the 
emerging settlements on the West Coast.146 In 1850 Congress 
began a concerted effort to establish peace treaties with the 
Plains Indians, including the Sioux.147 The 1851 Fort Laramie 
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Treaty (1851 Treaty) purported to do just that. Under the 
Treaty, several of the Great Plains Indian tribes, including the 
Sioux, established peace with the United States and vowed to 
keep peace among the traditionally warring tribes of the 
region.148 In return, the United States agreed to protect 
Indians from the increasing number of homesteading pioneers 
and, perhaps more importantly, agreed to compensate the 
Indians through $50,000 payments each year for fifty years.149 
The 1851 Treaty also included demarcations of tribal 
boundaries in order to keep peace among the Indians.150 The 
Sioux’s land under the Treaty stretched to some sixty million 
acres, including the Black Hills.151 With boundaries marked by 
the Missouri River, the Platte River, and the Heart River, the 
Sioux’s land under the Treaty encompassed large swaths across 
North and South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, and 
Nebraska.152 These boundaries were contentious to many Sioux 
present at the treaty negotiations as they gave both the Powder 
River and Big Horn Country—land which the Sioux had held 
since 1822—to the Crow and Kiowa, traditional enemies of the 
Sioux.153 The government is said to have placated the Sioux’s 
reluctance by clarifying that the boundaries established by the 
Treaty were principally to achieve peace and did not represent 
forfeitures of land for any tribe party to the Treaty.154 
Upon the terms of the deal reaching Congress, however, 
the government quickly and unilaterally altered the Treaty by 
reducing the annuity payments down from fifty years to ten.155 
The government also capitulated in enforcing the terms of the 
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Treaty against the swell of the gold rush miners and settlers.156 
As Lazarus notes,  
[T]he necessity of the undertakings (signing of the treaty) 
seemed terribly remote back in Washington, two thousand 
miles from the changing western landscape . . . . If the 
passing whites slaughtered the buffalo and deprived the 
tribesmen of their subsistence, the government would 
compensate them at least for the next decade. In the 
absence of a more immediate crisis few politicians thought 
beyond that.157 
The unilateral revision to the Treaty and establishment of 
arbitrary boundaries, along with the continued encroachment 
from settlers and the resulting destruction of the buffalo, 
worked together to ensure that the peace envisioned in the 
1851 Treaty would never materialize.158 Skirmishes and 
retaliations tested the tensions of all those involved, eventually 
festering into outright war.159 From around 1865 to 1868, the 
United States and Great Sioux Nation fought in the Powder 
River War, which was a series of battles in which the Sioux 
Tribes fought to protect the integrity of the Treaty lands 
against the incursion of white settlers and the construction of 
the Powder River Road.160 
Seeking an end to the violence on the plains and signaling 
a shift in Federal Indian policy, on July 20, 1867, Congress 
authorized the Indian Peace Commission to make peace with 
the plains tribes in hopes of establishing discrete reservations 
on which all whites would be excluded.161 The United States, 
acting under the auspices of the newly established 
Commission, sought to establish a second treaty, this time to 
end the war with the Sioux and facilitate the settling of the 
West.162 The Treaty Commission travelled up the Missouri 
River to meet with the leaders of the Great Sioux Nation, 
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where they negotiated the 1868 Sioux Nation Treaty.163 
Because each band of the Sioux Nation signed the Treaty 
at different times, the end result was documents that reflected 
conflicting narratives.164 For the Sioux, the 1868 Treaty was a 
peace made on their terms, as they had seemingly won on 
every point.165 The government, on the contrary, saw the 
conditions in the Treaty, which would lead to the eventual 
settlement of the Sioux within the strict bounds of a permanent 
reservation, as necessary steps preceding full assimilation of 
the natives.166 
In the Treaty of 1868, the Sioux Nation reserved the Great 
Sioux Reservation for their “absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupancy,” lands encompassing the western half of what is 
currently South Dakota.167 Along with these lands the Sioux 
also secured hunting and fishing rights in the appurtenant 
lands and waters.168 Under the Winters Doctrine, the 1868 
Treaty also maintained the Sioux’s rights in waters flowing 
through the originally defined boundaries established by the 
Treaty. This doctrine spawns from the Supreme Court case 
Winters v. United States,169 which held that in creating an 
Indian reservation, the United States implicitly reserved water 
rights for the Indians in the amount necessary to fulfill the 
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purposes for which the reservation was created.170 These 
reserved rights exist as of the date the reservation was created 
and need not be expressly reserved in the language of the 
Treaty.171 
Another important provision of the 1868 Treaty was 
included in Article XVI. Under this Article, certain lands to the 
northwest of the reservation boundaries were designated as 
“unceded Indian territory.”172 These were lands that had not 
been settled by whites, and as such, no white persons were 
allowed to settle or occupy any portion of the territory without 
consent of the Indians.173 This included the Powder River 
Country west of the Great Sioux Reservation, the same 
territory that certain bands of Sioux had issue with being given 
back to the Crow in the 1851 Treaty.174 
The government’s rationale behind designating this land 
was to appease a certain contingent of the Sioux who were 
more hostile to the idea of confinement posed by a permanent 
reservation.175 In doing so, “Indians who wished to live by the 
chase rather than by government dole might continue to reside 
in this tract. That neatly postponed a dispute over going to the 
reservation, but government officials confidently looked to the 
day when the extinction of the buffalo would eliminate the 
issue.”176 
For some, the choice to accept the Treaty and move onto 
the reservation came not from a desire to abandon their 
traditional lifestyle, but rather out of pure necessity.177 With 
the buffalo long since gone from their traditional lands to the 
south and a well-rationed United States army patrolling the 
countryside, the Brule, for example, had no choice but to make 
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their way to the reservation.178 According to one historian,  
[d]uring these years, the hunting bands followed the buffalo 
in the unceded territory, [while] the agency culture took root 
and bloomed. The two factions drifted even farther apart, 
separated not only by distance but also by thought, habit, 
relationship to the government, and above all by patterns 
born of dependence and independence.179 
From the outset, the United States and the non-treaty 
bands ranging in the North failed to honor the Treaty.180 
Congress failed to appropriate the funds needed to fulfill the 
promised rations and annuities provisions of the Treaty.181 The 
Sioux who were living near the agencies on the reservation 
“suffered without the blankets, clothes, knives, kettles, and 
other goods they had been promised, and they suffered from 
their new diet—too short on meat, too long on flour (which they 
did not know how to use), and altogether lacking in quality.”182 
What the Sioux could not have known at the time was 
that, although the signing of the 1868 Treaty would be the last 
true voluntary cession of land, over the next several decades 
their territory would be withered away by congressional 
acts.183 In 1874, at the behest of frontiersmen who had 
advocated throughout the 1860s to open up the Black Hills for 
mining, lumbering, and settlement, the United States Army 
undertook an exploratory expedition into the Black Hills.184 
Led by Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer, the 
expeditions sought to establish a military outpost from which 
to control the northern bands of Sioux who had not accepted 
the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty, as well as investigate 
claims of gold in the Black Hills.185 In a month the Army was 
in the Black Hills, and by August they had confirmed the 
presence of gold. The discovery of gold was widely reported and 
the expeditions’ descriptions of mineral and timber resources 
were met with an increased cry from the Dakota Territory to 
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Washington, D.C., demanding the opening of the Hills for 
settlement.186 The only obstacle, of course, were the Sioux and 
their 1868 Treaty.187 
Beginning in earnest in 1875, the United States went to 
great lengths to strike a deal for purchasing the Black Hills 
from the Sioux Nation.188 Though the efforts began with a 
diplomatic invitation for a Sioux delegation to visit Washington 
and meet with President Grant, it eventually evolved into the 
“sell-or-starve” tactics employed by Congress, which cut off food 
rations to the reservation agencies until the Sioux Nation 
agreed to sell the Black Hills.189 By 1877, the United States 
had had enough. On February 28, 1877, with the coerced 
signatures of roughly ten percent of the adult male Sioux, well 
short of the three-fourths required by the 1868 Treaty, 
Congress passed a statute which took large portions of the 
Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills.190  Under 
the statute, all of the lands outside the newly established 
reservation boundary, which did not include the Black Hills, 
were ceded to the United States along with lands in the 1868 
Treaty’s Article XVI unceded Indian Territory.191 
In 1889, Congress enacted another statute that would 
further diminish the Sioux’s 1868 Treaty lands.192 This Act 
dissolved the Great Sioux Reservation once and for all, 
splintering the Tribe’s land base into several distinct and 
smaller reservations, including the current reservations of the 
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes.193 The 1889 
Act set forth to preserve all the provisions of the previous 
treaties with the Sioux that were “not in conflict with” the new 
statute.194 The Act also set the eastern boundaries of the 
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Reservations as the “center 
of the main channel” of the Missouri River.195 
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In 1944, Congress again took aim at diminishing Sioux 
land holdings when it enacted the Flood Control Act.196 The Act 
authorized the construction of various dams along the Missouri 
River, and specifically authorized attendant takings of Sioux 
land.  Seven subsequent statutes further authorized the taking 
of Indian lands for the dam projects.197 
Two of these statutes provided for the acquisition of land 
from the Cheyenne River and Standing Rock Sioux Tribes for 
the newly created Oahe Reservoir.198 Collectively these tribes 
lost over 160,000 acres of the fertile lands along the Missouri 
River, which supported the tribes’ subsistence, forcing the 
relocation of families, buildings, and burial sites.199 The 
legislation contained important provisions, however, 
guaranteeing the tribes’ hunting, fishing, and grazing rights on 
the taken land as well as access to the Oahe Reservoir.200 
Overall, the Pick-Sloan Act has been the direct cause of 
more damage to Indian land and resources than any other 
public works legislation, with the Oahe Dam specifically 
destroying more Indian land than any other infrastructure 
project in American history.201 “The payments authorized” 
under the various acts were often belated and “based on hasty 
appraisals,” with “[c]ongressionally-directed mitigation 
measures, such as the reconstruction of hospitals and 
government offices as well as the relocation of cemeteries,” 
never materializing.202 Congress did not revisit the question of 
compensation to the tribes until a generation later.203 
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Unfortunately,  
the process by which the Missouri River Tribes obtained 
additional compensation for the taking of their valuable 
riparian land was as piecemeal and problematic as the 
legislative process for the original taking acts during the 
termination era of the 1950s. Consequently, some tribes 
have continued to petition the Congress for land restoration 
or additional compensation.204  
As recently as 2007, “the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
conducted a hearing on unresolved Tribal claims under Pick-
Sloan” in which testimony presented by the General 
Accounting Office “established ranges of recommended 
compensation for each of the Missouri River Tribes,” including 
a suggestion that “the Standing Rock Sioux, may be entitled to 
additional compensation.”205 
Altogether, there have been over seventy lawsuits filed in 
state and federal courts, and courts of special jurisdiction that 
have construed and analyzed the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 
and its various provisions.206  While the claims in these cases 
have ranged from determining the government’s obligations to 
furnish supplies to jurisdiction over hunting and fishing 
regulations, the cases generally illustrate the limited 
availability of tribal remedies for abrogation of their treaties, 
resulting in losses of lands and attendant devastation to their 
way of life.207 Two of the most relevant and well-known legal 
cases brought under the Sioux Treaties are Sioux Tribe of 
Indians v. United States and United States v. Sioux Nation. 
V.  SIOUX TRIBE OF INDIANS V. UNITED STATES 
In 1950, shortly after the establishment of the Indian 
Claims Commission presented the first method of legal redress 
for treaty violations, the Sioux Nation filed a claim for various 
 
 204. Id. at 179. 
 205. Id. (citing Impact of the Flood Control Act of 1944 on the Indian Tribes 
Along the Missouri River: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th 
Cong. 11–12 (2007) (statement of Robin Nazarro, Director Natural Res. Div., Gov’t 
Accountability Office)). 
 206. Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Construction and Application of Fort 
Laramie Treaty of 1868, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, 59 A.L.R Fed. 2d 243 (2011). 
 207. Id. 
 
510 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
land cessions under the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie and the 
Act of February 28, 1877 (the 1877 Act).208 The Commission 
separated the claims under the 1868 Treaty from those under 
the 1877 Act, giving rise to two separate lines of cases. As a 
result of persistent land dispossession and federal policies 
aimed at assimilation, the Great Sioux Nation had effectively 
dissolved in the 1890s, causing the eight present-day Sioux 
Tribes to bring the lawsuits in a representative capacity.209 
The Commission determined that the Sioux Nation had 
aboriginal title to the land obtained by the United States under 
the 1868 Treaty.210 It also found that the value of the land at 
the time of cession in 1869 was $45,685,000.211 The 
Commission disallowed all offsets requested by the government 
and, after making certain adjustments, awarded the Indians 
$43,949,700.212  
The government appealed, and the Court of Claims 
reversed the Commission’s denial of offsets, holding that the 
1868 Treaty was not a treaty of peace as the Commission had 
held, but was rather a treaty of cession.213 Due to this 
distinction, the payments and services the government 
supplied to the Sioux could be considered as compensation for 
the ceded land. The government was thus entitled to produce 
evidence accounting for the payments and services under the 
treaty as “payments . . . on the claim.”214 
Prior to the Court of Claims remand regarding the 
allowance of offsets, in October 1979 the government had made 
an offer to the Sioux Tribe’s attorneys to settle the offset issue 
for $4,200,000, resulting in an award of $39,749,700.215 The 
attorneys for the Sioux Tribes accepted the offer subject to 
conditions, which the government rejected.216 
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In 1983, the government again offered to settle the offset 
issue for $4,200,000, but the eight member-tribes . . . 
refused to consider the settlement. The Claims Court, the 
successor to the Trial Division of the Court of Claims, then 
ordered the Sioux Tribe’s counsel formally to present the 
settlement offer to the tribes, and further directed the 
tribes, through their governing bodies, to consider and act 
upon the offer.217  
Two of the tribes accepted the settlement, four of the tribes 
explicitly denied the settlement in favor of seeking return of 
the lands ceded under the 1868 Treaty, and two of the tribes 
implicitly rejected it by failing to respond to the settlement.218  
Ultimately, in 1985, the Claims Court concluded that the 
litigation had become “an uncontrolled quagmire” and that  
the simple fact that four of the reservation tribes are 
refusing to accept any settlement or award of this Court, 
which does not include the return of their land, is indicative 
of the plaintiff’s [sic] refusal to comprehend, after thirty-five 
years of litigation, that this Court can only award money 
judgments.219  
Thus, the court terminated the litigation and awarded the 
Sioux Tribes $39,749,700 as fair and equitable compensation 
for its claims of land cession under the 1868 Treaty.220 The 
Federal Court of Appeals held that the Claims Court had 
improperly imposed upon the parties a settlement to which 
they had not consented, and accordingly vacated the award and 
remanded the case to the Claims Court for further proceedings 
to resolve the claim.221 
“On July 29, 1987, seven months later, the parties filed . . . 
a Stipulation of Facts ‘regarding the offsets of the government 
in this case’ and a joint motion ‘to enter judgment in 
accordance with the Stipulation of Facts.’”222 In part, the 
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Motion for Judgment stated: “The parties move the Court to 
approve the Stipulation of Facts and to enter judgment in 
accordance with the Stipulation of Facts in the amount of 
$40,245,807.02 which represents the gross award of 
$43,949,700 less stipulated offsets of $3,703,892.98.”223 The 
Claims Court agreed and issued judgment for the Sioux Tribe, 
authorizing a recovery from the United States of 
$40,245,807.02.224 
Two months later the Oglala and Rosebud Sioux Tribes 
filed a motion seeking relief from the judgment, arguing that 
the attorney of record had no authority to enter a motion which 
formed the basis for the final judgment and that the 
“substantial legal, moral and political interests of the Tribes 
would be harmed if not vacated.”225 In acknowledging 
Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs and the Court’s 
limited available remedies, the Claims Court declined to vacate 
its judgment on the ground that “[i]t is not for this Court to say 
whether the Congress of the United States will ever decide to 
return some or all of the Sioux land.”226 
In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, the court of 
appeals ended thirty-eight years of litigation by affirming the 
Court of Claims award for land ceded by the 1868 Treaty. 227 In 
doing so, the court agreed that the Sioux Nation had aboriginal 
title to approximately fourteen million acres of land east of the 
Missouri River which were ceded to the United States by the 
1868 Treaty.228 However, the court of appeals also held that the 
Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the two 
Sioux Tribes’ motion for relief from the judgment and that 
counsel for the Sioux Tribes “had authority to enter the 
stipulation of facts that resulted in the final judgment.”229 
Finally, the court of appeals found that the tribes’ request to 
vacate the judgment, and award them compensation for the 
treaty violations, and to allow them to seek dismissal and 
thereby deny them the benefits of the award, was untimely and 
thus could not be allowed.230 
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VI. UNITED STATES V. SIOUX NATION 
The Sioux’s claim for the taking of the Black Hills would 
take a somewhat more complicated path. After Congress 
passed the Act, the Sioux made consistent claims that they 
regarded the 1877 Act as a breach of the 1868 Treaty.231 
However, Congress failed to enact a mechanism under which 
the Sioux could litigate their claims against the United States 
until 1920, when a special jurisdictional act was passed after 
years of lobbying by the Sioux.232 The Sioux brought suit under 
this Act in the Court of Claims, “alleging that the Government 
had taken the Black Hills without just compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.”233 The Court of Claims 
dismissed the case in 1942, holding the 1920 Act did not 
authorize adjudication of whether the compensation afforded 
the Sioux in the 1877 Act was adequate, and that the Sioux’s 
claim was a “moral” one not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment’s just compensation clause.234  
Upon enactment of the Indian Claims Commission Act in 
1946, the Sioux resubmitted their claim to the Indian Claims 
Commission along with their claim for land ceded under the 
1868 Treaty.235 After bifurcating the claims, the Commission 
held that the 1942 Court of Claims decision did not bar the 
Sioux’s taking claim and in fact, the Sioux were entitled to just 
compensation because the 1877 Act constituted a taking.236 On 
appeal, the Court of Claims affirmed the Commission’s holding 
and ultimately found the Sioux were entitled to an award of at 
least $17.5 million, without interest, for the lands surrendered 
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 236. United States v. Sioux Nation, 518 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 
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under the 1877 Act and for resources taken by trespassing 
settlers prior to passage of the Act.237 However, the court also 
held that the merits of the takings claim had been reached in 
its 1942 case brought under the 1920 jurisdictional statute and 
that, whether resolved “rightly or wrongly,” the present claim 
was thus barred by res judicata.238 The court also noted that 
only if the acquisition of the Black Hills amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking would the Sioux be entitled to 
interest.239 
On March 13, 1978, Congress passed an act providing 
for de novo review by the Court of Claims of whether the 1877 
Act effected a taking of the Black Hills, without regard to res 
judicata, and authorizing the consideration of new evidence.240 
In its review, the Court of Claims applied the Fort Berthold 
test241 to distinguish between a taking for which interest is 
owed and a mere breach of trust for which no interest is 
owed.242 Upon consideration, the court affirmed the 
Commission’s holding the 1877 Act as a taking in exercise of 
Congress’s power of eminent domain over Indian property.243 
Accordingly, the court held that the Sioux were entitled to an 
award of interest at an annual rate of five percent dating from 
1877 on a principal compensation sum of $17 million.244 
The government unsurprisingly filed for appeal before the 
Supreme Court in 1979, asking the Court to review the 
constitutional question of whether ceded Indian lands are 
compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment.245 The Court 
granted certiorari in what would become perhaps the most 
important Indian takings case decided by the Court.246 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1306. 
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 240. Act of Mar. 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153. 
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 246. Clinton, supra note 8, at 201–02. 
 
2018] STANDING ROCK, THE SIOUX TREATIES 515 
In United States v. Sioux Nation, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Indian Claims Commission’s holding that the 
government’s 1877 acquisition of the Black Hills constituted an 
unjust taking under the Fifth Amendment.247 In concluding 
such a violation had taken place, the Supreme Court similarly 
invoked the Fort Berthold test to determine whether the 
government made a good faith effort to provide full value to the 
Tribe.248  As discussed by the Court, the Fort Berthold test had 
been designed to reconcile two lines of cases that were 
seemingly in conflict with one another.249 
The first line of cases centered wholly on Lone Wolf’s 
invocation of plenary power and Congress’s “paramount power 
over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of 
guardianship over their interests, and that such authority 
might be implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a 
treaty with the Indians.”250 The second line followed the 
Court’s decision in Shoshone, which conceded Congress’s 
paramount power over Indian property, but held that “[t]he 
power does not extend so far as to enable the Government to 
give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its 
own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to 
render, just compensation.”251  
In distinguishing the case from Lone Wolf, the Court held 
the 1877 Act did not alter the investment of Indian tribal 
property, but constituted a taking of tribally owned property 
which had been given to the Sioux for their exclusive 
occupation.252 Because the Act constituted a taking, it required 
the government to pay just compensation to the Sioux 
Nation.253 
 
 247. 448 U.S. 371, 423–24 (1980). 
 248. Id. at 416–21. 
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These cases and the Court’s reasoning demonstrate that 
“when it finally became possible” to legally address the 
expropriation of the treaty lands under the 1868 Treaty and 
1877 Act, “the only legally cognizable claim, in light of 
[Congress’s plenary power as espoused in] Lone Wolf, was a 
[Fifth Amendment] takings claim, the remedy for which was a 
cash payment . . . rather than” specific performance of the 
treaty and “return of [the treaty-protected] lands.”254 After 
almost a half-century of litigation, the land cessions imposed on 
the Sioux Nation had resulted in a “squabble over money,” 
regardless of the assurance of the Supremacy Clause that their 
treaties constituted the “law of the land.”255 
Enforcement of the takings clause in Sioux Nation left the 
federal government in possession of the Black Hills, a result of 
the limited remedial regime for Indian taking claims under 
United States law.256 After United States v. Sioux Nation, 
Indians can finally get just compensation for federal takings of 
the treaty-reserved lands or resources if they can show an 
unjust result and Congress’s bad intent, but otherwise are 
limited in securing the return of lands and resources once 
expropriated.257 As the Court of Claims stated in Sioux Indian 
Tribe v. United States, “[i]t is not for this Court to say whether 
the Congress of the United States will ever decide to return 
some or all of the Sioux land.”258 
To truly understand what is at stake for the Tribes and 
their members, the fight against DAPL must be viewed against 
this intricate and checkered historical context. For the Sioux 
Tribes engaged in this historic battle, the present is 
inextricably linked with the past, and despite the voluminous 
litigation and claims settlement, the 1851 and 1868 Treaties 
survive as the truest representation of their status as 
independent sovereign nations. 
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VII. THE FIGHT AGAINST THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE 
Today, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe is waging a historic 
battle against DAPL, a 1,168-mile-long oil and gas pipeline 
that will carry 570,000 barrels of crude oil daily from the 
Bakken region of North Dakota across four states to refineries 
in southern Illinois.259 The pipeline intersects the 1851 Treaty 
reservation and traditional territories of the Tribes, lands to 
which the Tribes continue to have strong cultural, spiritual, 
and historical ties.260 
The abrogation and unilateral “settlement” of the treaty by 
the convoluted Indian claims regime and the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Sioux Nation has limited the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe’s legal remedies against the United States for 
activities taking place on its treaty lands and impacting its 
treaty resources. Because of the fact that the pipeline path lies 
within the boundaries of the 1851 Treaty and on lands that 
contain Standing Rock’s vital cultural, spiritual, and physical 
resources, the case shows the utter failure of the Supremacy 
Clause to ensure the original treaty be respected as the 
“supreme Law of the Land.” 
In June 2014, Dakota Access, the entity charged with 
building the pipeline, notified the Army Corps of Engineers 
(Army Corps) of its intent to construct DAPL underneath Lake 
Oahe.261 In October of the same year, Dakota Access sought to 
obtain multiple authorizations needed to begin construction, 
including verifications that it complied with Nationwide Permit 
12 under the Clean Water Act, permission under the Rivers 
and Harbors Act, and an easement under the Mineral and 
Leasing Act.262 In December 2015, the Army Corps published 
and sought comment on a Draft Environmental Assessment 
(EA) that evaluated the environmental effects of DAPL’s 
proposed crossing at Lake Oahe.263 
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe submitted comments to the 
Draft EA that highlighted a number of concerns about the 
 
 259. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:16-cv-01534-JEB (D.D.C. July 27, 2016). 
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Draft EA’s inadequacy. In particular, the Tribe was concerned 
that it failed to consider the potential harm to the Tribe’s 
rights resulting from the construction and operation of the 
pipeline, to acknowledge the proximity to the Standing Rock 
Reservation, and to consider environmental justice concerns.264 
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe submitted comments on the 
Draft EA expressing similar concerns.265 
The Tribes were not the only entities that expressed 
concern with the Draft EA. The Department of the Interior 
(DOI), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation all submitted 
comments to the Army Corps. Their comments highlighted the 
lack of analysis on DAPL’s impact on treaty and trust 
resources, specifically the impact on water resources.266 
Nonetheless, on July 25, 2016, the Army Corps published a 
Final EA and Mitigated Finding of No Significant Impact.267 
Under this Final EA, the Corps provided Dakota Access with 
verifications of compliance with Nationwide Permit 12 and 
granted permission under the Rivers and Harbor Act necessary 
for construction under Lake Oahe, while assuming the Corps 
did not grant an easement under the Mineral Leasing Act.268 
Two days later, on July 27, 2016, Standing Rock filed suit 
against the Army Corps seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.269 In its complaint, the Tribe claimed the Corps 
violated multiple federal statutes in its approval of the 
construction and operation of DAPL. Specifically, the Tribe 
brought claims for relief under the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA), National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), Clean Water Act, and Rivers and Harbors Act.270  On 
August 10, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe successfully 
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intervened as a plaintiff and subsequently filed its own 
complaint which plead claims under the same four statutes.271 
On August 4, 2016, Standing Rock filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction based solely on violations of the 
NHPA.272 Specifically, the motion focused on violations of 
Section 106 of the Act, which requires consultations with Tribal 
governments where a project has the potential to impact sites 
of cultural and historic relevance to the Tribe.273 In its motion, 
the Tribe cited a survey prepared by a Dakota Access 
consultant which identified dozens of historical and 
archaeological sites in the pipeline’s path, many of which had 
been deemed “unevaluated.”274 
On September 2, Standing Rock submitted to the court the 
recent discovery of stone features and graves that were 
immediately adjacent to the pipeline’s right-of-way, 
approximately two-to-four miles away from the Lake Oahe 
crossing.275 The very next day, Dakota Access moved 
construction equipment to the previously undisturbed tract of 
land identified by the Tribe in the September 2, 2016 filing, 
and began to grate over the exact parcels of land identified in 
the filing as having archeological and burial remains.276 In 
response, on September 4, 2016, Standing Rock and Cheyenne 
River filed motions for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in 
response to the deliberate destruction of historic and religious 
sites in the pipeline’s path.277 The TRO intended to halt 
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construction in areas east of State Highway 1806 where the 
demolition took place, and within twenty miles on either side of 
Lake Oahe.278 
After hearing oral arguments on September 6, 2016, the 
court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the 
Tribe’s motion.279 The court ordered that no construction 
activity on DAPL may take place between Highway 1806 and 
twenty miles to the east of Lake Oahe. Construction activity to 
the west of Highway 1806 was allowed to continue.280 
On September 8, 2016, Cheyenne River filed an amended 
complaint which alleged the Corps’ authorizations of DAPL 
violated the United States’ trust relationship with the Tribe as 
well as the Tribe’s treaty and statutorily protected property 
right in the water of the Missouri River.281 Specifically, the 
Tribe argued that their reserved water right equaled a vested 
property right which is held in trust by the United States.282  
The Tribe went on to argue that by issuing authorizations 
without “engaging in a government-to-government consultation 
with tribes on actions that could impair tribal trust resources,” 
and “without a full EIS to address concerns about the safety of 
the Tribe’s water” breached the Corps’ trust responsibility to 
the Tribe.283 The court denied Cheyenne River’s amended 
complaint, instead urging Cheyenne River to work with 
Standing Rock on a consolidated amended complaint.284 
Just one day later, on September 9, 2016, the court issued 
an Order denying Standing Rock’s motion for preliminary 
injunction.285 In its order, the court summarized the Tribe’s 
arguments against the permitting of the pipeline, focusing four 
arguments on the NHPA and Section 106 determinations. The 
court also noted that “Standing Rock Sioux do not claim that a 
potential future rupture in the pipeline could damage their 
reserved land or water. Instead, they point to . . . the likelihood 
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that DAPL’s ongoing construction activities . . . might damage 
sites of great cultural or historical significance.”286 The court 
focused on the fact that the majority of sacred sites identified 
by the Tribe were located on private land, outside of the 
jurisdiction of the Army Corps.287 Thus, the court found that 
the Tribe could not demonstrate how an injunction against the 
Army Corps could prevent the harm to cultural sites from 
construction on private land.288 
The court also found problematic the Tribe’s definition of 
its ancestral lands as “wherever the buffalo roamed,”289 stating 
“there is at least some evidence in the record that [ancestral 
lands] do not traverse the entirety of DAPL.”290 According to 
the Order, this broad and ubiquitous definition of ancestral 
lands would lead the court to have to guess as to whether an 
interest of the Tribe would be affected at certain points of the 
pipeline, an exercise it refused to undertake.291 Without 
identifying the specific location and resources that would be 
affected by construction (the sites destroyed on September 3 
notwithstanding, as “for those sites, the die is cast”),292 the 
Court found that Standing Rock had failed to carry their 
burden in identifying a likely irreparable injury and denied the 
preliminary injunction.293 
Within moments of the court’s denial of the Tribe’s motion, 
the Department of Justice, DOI, and the Department of the 
Army issued a joint statement announcing suspension of all 
additional permitting relating to the pipeline’s crossing at Lake 
Oahe due to “important issues raised by the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe and other tribal nations.”294 The statement also 
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provided that construction on federal lands bordering Lake 
Oahe would be halted while officially calling on Dakota Access 
to suspend all construction within twenty miles of the 
crossing.295 
The next day the Tribes filed an appeal of the district 
court’s order to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. On September 12, 2016, Standing Rock filed a 
motion seeking an emergency injunction pending appeal of the 
district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction.296 On 
October 9, 2016, the court of appeals issued an order denying 
the Tribe’s motion and dissolving the administrative injunction 
that was holding off construction of the pipeline within twenty 
miles of the river.297 The court cited a necessary easement that 
the government had yet to issue in finding the Tribe had not 
“met the narrow and stringent standard governing this 
extraordinary form of relief.”298 
On October 19, 2016, the district court granted Cheyenne 
River’s request for reconsideration and filed the Tribe’s 
amended complaint.299 Cheyenne River’s complaint placed 
consideration of the impact of the Treaties of Fort Laramie and 
the trust responsibility of the United States to the Tribes 
squarely before the court. It is important to note, however, that 
while the Tribe’s amended complaint sought relief under 
breach of the Federal Trust responsibility, the Tribe did not 
claim relief under either the 1851 or 1868 Treaties. 
After the United States halted construction, Standing Rock 
sent multiple letters to the Army Corps expressing concerns 
regarding the Final EA’s lack of consideration of a potential 
spill’s impact on hunting, fishing, and other treaty rights.300  
With these and other submitted materials in hand, on 
November 14, 2016, the Army and DOI issued a joint 
statement which found that after a review of the available 
information, further analysis was warranted before granting 
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an easement for the pipeline crossing.301 
Standing Rock then engaged in discussions with the Corps 
concerning the mitigating conditions and easement for the 
crossing that would reduce risk and “otherwise enhance the 
protection of Lake Oahe, the Tribe’s water supplies, and its 
treaty rights.”302 During these discussions, Standing Rock 
provided further comments on DAPL’s potential harm to their 
water, hunting, fishing, and gathering rights.303 It was during 
this additional review phase that the Army Corps also sought 
the opinion of the DOI in determining whether the Tribe’s 
treaty rights “weigh[ed] in favor or against” granting the final 
easement necessary to construct DAPL underneath Lake 
Oahe.304 
The treaty claims continued to lurk in the background of 
the case, and on December 4, 2016, the Solicitor for DOI issued 
a memorandum extensively analyzing the Tribes’ treaty rights 
implicated by the construction and operation of DAPL.305 In 
her memorandum, the Solicitor comprehensively discussed 
both the 1851 and 1868 Treaties, as well as the litany of 
legislation abrogating these rights.306 In addition to finding 
that Standing Rock and Cheyenne River retain their 
preexisting on-reservation hunting and fishing rights in the 
lands used to create Lake Oahe, the Solicitor’s memorandum 
also pointed to the Tribes’ reserved water rights under the 
Winters Doctrine as requiring consideration.307 Ultimately, the 
Solicitor concluded that because of the treaty rights at issue, 
the Army Corps had “ample legal justification to decline to 
issue the proposed Lake Oahe easement on the current 
record.”308 She further determined that the Army Corps would 
be “equally justified in suspending or revoking the existing 
Section 408 [Rivers and Harbors Act] permit.”309 The Solicitor 
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went on to urge the Corps to delay a decision on the easement 
pending consultations with the Tribes and a full 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which “adequately 
evaluates the existence of and potential impacts to tribal rights 
and interests.”310 
The same day, the Army Corps issued its own 
memorandum that announced it would deny the final permit 
needed to construct the pipeline underneath Lake Oahe, 
pending a full EIS.311 The Army Corps memorandum went on 
to acknowledge the checkered history of the United States’ 
dealings with the Great Sioux Nation in inviting the Tribe to 
engage in discussions surrounding the pipeline’s path and 
safety.312 
The results of the 2016 election rendered consideration of 
DAPL’s impact on the Tribes’ treaty rights short-lived. On 
January 24, 2017, four days after assuming office, President 
Trump issued a presidential memorandum that called on the 
Army Corps to “review and approve in an expedited manner . . . 
requests for approvals to construct and operate the DAPL.”313 
On February 3, 2017, the Army Corps abruptly ended the 
ongoing EIS and comment period, and found the Final EA 
satisfied the requirements under federal law.314 
On February 9, the Tribes responded, with Cheyenne River 
filing motions for a preliminary injunction and TRO.315 
Cheyenne River also filed their second amended complaint.316  
The amended complaint sought relief under the Religious 
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Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment in 
addition to citing both the 1851 and 1868 treaties as they 
conferred an obligation on the Army Corps to manage the 
waters of the Missouri River and Lake Oahe.317 The motions 
focused solely on the RFRA claims. The next day, Standing 
Rock joined Cheyenne River’s motion for preliminary 
injunction and filed their own amended complaint, this time 
including claims under the RFRA, the Mineral Leasing Act, 
and the Administrative Procedure Act.318 
After the hearing on February 13, 2016, the Court denied 
Cheyenne River’s TRO request and required that Dakota 
Access provide an update on every Monday thereafter as to the 
likely date that oil would begin to flow beneath Lake Oahe.319 
The next day, on February 14, 2017, Standing Rock filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment alleging that the Army 
Corps authorizations, including the easement, violated its 
duties under NEPA by failing to consider DAPL’s effects on 
tribal treaty rights and environmental-justice considerations; 
that its February decision to grant the easement was arbitrary 
and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure 
Act; and, that the Army Corps had violated the Clean Water 
Act by finding the pipeline satisfied Nationwide Permit 12.320 
Standing Rock’s motion asserted that its treaty rights 
should be considered, specifically arguing that the EA’s failure 
to consider the effects of DAPL on the Tribe’s treaty rights was 
improper. The Tribe also asserted that its treaty rights should 
be considered as part of NEPA, which requires the Army Corps 
to assess the range of risks posed by DAPL to the “full range of 
Tribe’s Treaty rights, in the context of the Army Corps’ 
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heightened trust responsibility.”321 The Tribe specifically 
highlighted the potential impact to water, hunting, and fishing 
rights reserved to them in the treaties.322 Cheyenne River 
joined Standing Rock’s motion and filed its own motion for 
partial summary judgment.323 
On June 14, 2017, the court issued an opinion on the 
Tribes’ motions for summary judgment.324 Despite holding that 
the Army Corps substantially complied with its statutory 
responsibilities in the permit process, importantly, the court 
held that the Final EA adopted by the Army Corps “did not 
adequately consider the impacts of an oil spill on fishing rights 
[and] hunting rights.”325 
Although the court did not hold that the EA’s analysis of 
spill impacts on water satisfied NEPA, the EA mentioned 
Standing Rock’s reserved water rights in passing, but 
completely omitted Cheyenne River’s water rights.326  Instead, 
the EA discussed a potential spill’s impact on water resources 
of Lake Oahe only generally, noting that “Standing Rock Sioux 
have an intake structure within the river downstream of the 
Lake Oahe project area.”327 Thus, despite extensive evidence in 
the record, the EA displayed a complete lack of analysis of the 
impact specifically on the Tribes’ reserved water rights.328 The 
court also found that the EA “adequately discusses the impacts 
of [an oil spill] on water—but not on hunting or aquatic—
resources.”329 
The treaty claims ultimately were persuasive to the court, 
as it found that acknowledgement of, or attention to, the 
impact of an oil spill on the Tribe’s fishing and hunting rights 
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would be required for the assessment to be adequate.330  
Pointing to the “cursory nod” given to the potential effects of an 
oil spill on these resources, the court found that the Army 
Corps must go beyond acknowledging the potential risks in the 
EA by taking steps to identify the risks an oil spill would pose 
to wild and aquatic life, which are resources implicating the 
Tribe’s treaty rights.331 
The court’s emphasis on “inadequate consideration” points 
to the limited nature of relief available for the Tribes under 
United States law. Specifically, NEPA requires the government 
to consider impacts on the Tribes’ treaty rights, but as 
construed by the court, it does not require the government to 
take any actions to avoid or minimize DAPL’s impacts on the 
Tribes’ rights and resources.332 In fact, the court stated that it 
could not demand the Army Corps undertake a full analysis of 
the Tribes’ treaty rights, instead requiring only that the Army 
Corps undertake to “consider” impacts: “The Tribe contends 
that the Army Corps had to address Treaty rights qua Treaty 
Rights, whereas the Army Corps asserts that it needed only to 
consider the effects on the resources implicated by the Treaty 
rights—i.e. water, fish and game.”333 The court went on to side 
with the Army Corps, finding that “it is sufficient that the 
agency adequately analyze impacts on the resource covered by 
a given treaty.”334 
The court also stated: 
Standing Rock may be right that the construction and 
operation of DAPL under Lake Oahe could affect its 
members in the broad and existential ways it details, but it 
offers no case, law, statutory provisions, regulations, or 
other authority to support its position that NEPA requires 
such a sweeping analysis.335 
Finally, despite acknowledging the inadequacy of the EA, the 
court failed to order the pipeline operators to stop operations, 
citing the “serious consequences” that would transpire if the 
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pipeline were forced to stop.336 Thus, despite acknowledging 
the inadequacy of the EA’s consideration of the Tribes’ treaty 
rights, the court implicitly valued the profits of a corporation 
over the terms of a treaty that was signed between sovereign 
nations and declared the law of the land by the Supremacy 
Clause. 
The court’s analysis denies consideration of the rights 
conferred in the 1851 and 1868 Treaties as the ultimate 
authority requiring the government to accordingly tailor its 
actions that may threaten and implicate treaty rights. The 
court’s analysis here directly contravenes the constitutional 
promise that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land.”337 
Under United States law, the only historic remedies for the 
taking of a Tribe’s ancestral land and resources, whether 
provided under statute or the Constitution, has been monetary 
compensation. But as Standing Rock and the Sioux Tribes’ 
battle against DAPL has made very clear, these colonial-based 
legal mechanisms have left unresolved many fundamental 
issues relating to Indian tribes—including their rights to 
ancestral land and the enforcement of surviving treaty rights 
in the context of unilateral land cessions. As former United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples James Anaya has stated, “What is now needed is a 
resolve to take action to address the pending, deep-seated 
concerns of indigenous peoples, but within current notions of 
justice and the human rights of indigenous peoples.”338 
The fundamental concepts of justice and human rights for 
indigenous peoples that former Special Rapporteur Anaya 
refers to can be fairly summarized in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The 
Declaration embodies the norms and standards by which actors 
can protect the rights of indigenous people, primarily through 
employing the practice of Free Prior and Informed Consent.339 
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But within the broader context of increased international 
attention to the rights of indigenous people, a particular focus 
has largely been placed on the protection of indigenous peoples’ 
rights over traditional lands and natural resources.340 
Moreover, the international standards and norms that have 
developed in relation to indigenous peoples and rights to land 
and resources often go beyond the existing international and 
domestic treaty obligations.341 As former Special Rapporteur 
Anaya and co-author Rob Williams explain: 
Domestic legal developments are not necessarily sufficient 
to protect indigenous peoples in the enjoyment of 
their land and resource tenure. And, of course, those 
domestic legal advances already achieved remain far from 
fully implemented and translated into reality 
for indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, these developments 
signify a clear trend in the direction of the relevant 
international practice, and they constitute legal obligations 
for state officials under domestic law and give rise to 
expectations of conforming behavior on the part of the 
international community.342 
In many ways the controversy surrounding DAPL has 
highlighted the insufficiencies in the United States domestic 
legal framework to protect tribal lands and resources. 
Moreover, this framework not only includes domestic legal 
advances discussed by Anaya and Williams, such as the 
consultation regime enshrined in various federal statues, 
executive orders, and regulations, but existing obligations and 
rights guaranteed in bilateral treaties with Indian tribes.343 
Thus, for Indian treaty rights to be given life and meaning 
in United States courts, there must be a continued shift 
towards the developing international norms relating to 
Indigenous rights, including a reexamination of the domestic 
framework relating to ancestral land and resource claims to 
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include measures of land restoration and general 
reconciliation. While there can be a number of ways 
reconciliation-based mechanisms for Native land and resource 
concessions could be implemented in the existing United States 
system, former U.N. Special Rapporteur James Anaya provided 
an outline for such implementation when he posited that, 
Measures of reconciliation and redress should include, inter 
alia, initiatives to address outstanding claims of treaty 
violations or non-consensual takings of traditional lands to 
which indigenous peoples retain cultural or economic 
attachment, and to restore or secure indigenous peoples’ 
capacities to maintain connections with places and sites of 
cultural or religious significance . . . .344 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Sioux Tribes’ legal actions in the fight 
against the DAPL are still pending, the court has, to date, 
denied numerous requests that would have barred construction 
and operation of the pipeline pending resolution of the Tribes’ 
legal claims. The dearth of judicial protections has allowed 
construction to occur underneath Lake Oahe in direct 
opposition to the Tribes’ requests and in violation of their 
treaty rights. 
In addressing the Tribes’ treaty rights implicated by 
DAPL, the courts have thus far failed to rule that the treaty 
rights alone create a legal basis to challenge the actions of the 
Army Corps in its approval of the project. This reading of 
treaty rights as cabined within judicial doctrine diminishes the 
status of treaty rights as law, as explicitly set forth in the 
Supremacy Clause. 
Under the fundamental understanding of a treaty, the 
obligations conferred constitute contractual rights between 
sovereign nations that should be honored.345 
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Further, under United States v. Sioux Nation, the only 
remedy for violations of these rights is monetary compensation. 
Through the application of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause and the “settling” of Indian claims through the Indian 
Claims Commission and Court of Claims, the caselaw has 
diminished the only constitutionally recognized claims for 
Indians—treaty claims—limiting Tribes’ attempts to protect 
their lifeways, their ancestral and treaty-reserved lands and 
resources to the existing “consultation” and other procedural 
provisions in various federal statutes.346 
For Indian tribes whose cultures and sovereignty are 
inextricably tied to land ownership, the current constitutional 
doctrines create a no-win scenario for treaty tribes in situations 
where Congress possesses unilateral power to abrogate treaties 
and Indian claims are considered “settled” by the just 
compensation regime. Further, the struggle undertaken at 
Standing Rock made two things clear: first, human rights 
implications are inherent in the difficulties encountered by 
tribes to maintain rights to their ancestral homelands and 
resources, once expropriated; and second, the lack of a rights-
based framework and attendant remedies under federal law. 
The current lack of a rights-based mechanism to ensure 
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performance of tribal treaty obligations illustrates the fallacy of 
the Supremacy Clause. The situation faced by the Great Sioux 
Nation begs reconsideration of the deference tribal treaties are 
due under the text of the Constitution. 
 
